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Economic fashion follows long cycles. After a half-century 
lull, the empirical analysis of business cycles has again 
become fashionable. Cherished beliefs, having quietly ma-
tured from conjecture to stylized fact, are coming under 
attack. In a recent provocative article, for example, Finn 
Kydland and Edward Prescott (1990) claim that the popular 
assertion of a procyclical price level for the postwar U.S. 
economy is one of these unfounded beliefs, a "myth." 
Examining the data for the period since the Korean War, 
they instead find U.S. prices to be strongly countercyclical. 
This finding, if robust, suggests that traditional demand-
driven models of the business cycle are inadequate represen-
tations of reality. A rendezvous between theory and evi-
dence, then, requires a significantly enhanced role for sup-
ply-side shocks in business cycle modeling or a shift toward 
models of (locally) increasing returns to scale. 
The implications of the Kydland-Prescott result warrant 
further study of the data. I here assume the role of devil's 
advocate, attempting to punch a hole in countercyclicality. 
I succeed—halfway: The strong countercyclicality hypoth-
esis needs to be qualified in two directions. First, 
countercyclicality is a post-1973 rather than a post-1953 
phenomenon. Second, countercyclicality is significantly 
more pronounced for negative than for positive output 
innovations. Except for these two quibbles, Kydland and 
Prescott's result is sturdy: Across a broad range of indexes, 
prices exhibit substantial countercyclicality. 
Timing Matters ... 
In performing their calculations, Kydland and Prescott 
implicitly treat the entire postwar period as a single realiza-
tion of an unchanging data generation process. Temporal 
disaggregation casts doubt on the validity of this assump-
tion. 
A Closer Look at Correlations Between 
U.S. Output and Prices: Across Periods of Time ... 
Average Contemporaneous Correlations Between Deviations From Trend of 
the Industrial Production Index and the Producer Price Index 
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Years in Center of Five-Year Periods 
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Source of basic data: International Monetary Fund data base 
25 Table 1 
... And Types of Product... 
Correlation Between Deviations From Trend of the Real Gross National Product 
and the Prices of Various Wholesale Products in Two Sample Periods* 
Correlation of Real GNP With Price of 
i ype oi 
Wholesale Product x 
sample 
Period  x(t- 4)  x(t-3)  x(t- 2)  *(M)  x(t)  *(/+1)  x(U2)  x(/+3)  x(M) 
Farm and Food  1957-72  .07  .04  .02  .03  .10  .24  .38  .46  .50 
Products  1973-89  -.42  -.27  -.13  .02  .11  .18  .24  .27  .30 
Industrial Products 
Chemicals  1957-72  .03  -.02  -.07  -.08  -.06  .12  .28  .44  .51 
1973-89  -.39  -.54  -.65  -.69  -.66  -.53  -.37  -.21  -.03 
Fuels  1957-72  -.01  -.05  -.06  -.18  .02  .14  .21  .29  .34 
1973-89  -.53  -.58  -.56  -.51  -.44  -.31  -.20  -06  .10 
Crude Petroleum  1957-72  -.00  -.08  -11  -.10  -.07  .10  .23  .35  .42 
1973-89  -.50  -.49  -.43  -.36  -.32  -.26  -.20  -.11  .02 
Machinery and  1957-72  -.18  -.24  -.31  -.33  -.29  -.05  .14  .29  .34 
Equipment  1973-89  -.30  -.47  -.63  -.73  -.75  -.64  -.49  -.32  -.12 
Metals  1957-72  -20  -.19  -.14  -.08  -.01  .11  .21  .26  .32 
1973-89  -41  -.52  -.54  -.46  -.32  -.14  .02  .15  .26 
Lumber and Wood  1957-72  -.10  .11  .29  .42  .52  .46  .33  .16  -.00 
1973-89  .19  .37  .57  .70  .75  .64  .49  .32  .15 
Pulp and Paper  1957-72  -.13  -.17  -.15  -.07  .03  .25  .40  .48  .47 
1973-89  -.46  -.62  -.71  -.70  -.61  -.42  -.24  -.08  .06 
Rubber and Plastics  1957-72  -.20  -.20  -.19  -.16  -.08  .10  .21  .29  .41 
1973-89  -.39  -.57  -.68  -.70  -.63  -47  -.29  -12  .04 
Textiles, Apparel,  1957-72  -.16  -.14  -.10  -.03  .03  .20  .30  .36  .38 
and Leather Products  1973-89  -.53  -.63  -.66  -.62  -.53  -.37  -.23  -.07  .09 
Household Durables  1957-72  -.18  -.23  -.27  -.29  -.24  -.04  .14  .27  .34 
1973-89  -.31  -.49  -.63  -.71  -.68  -.56  -.40  -.24  -.05 
All Wholesale  1957-72  -.05  -.06  -.04  .01  .09  .26  .39  .46  .49 
Products  1973-89  -.62  -.64  -.60  -.51  -.40  -.23  -.09  .04  .20 
*AII basic data are quarterly and have been detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Sources of basic data: International Monetary Fund and Citicorp data bases 
The accompanying chart provides one perspective. It 
plots the average correlations between innovations in indus-
trial production and prices for five-year periods, starting 
with 1957-61 and ending with 1984-88.| Rather than 
exhibiting uniform countercyclicality, postwar prices ap-
pear to have been mildly procyclical until the late 1960s and 
to have become highly countercyclical only in the early 
1970s. Most recently, prices have returned to mild 
tThe same statistical methodology as in Kydland and Prescott 1990 is used. 
However, the qualitative results are fairly robust with respect to the detrending 
method employed: first-differenced series and residuals from exponential trends 
yield very similar results. 
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Table 2 
... And Directions of Shock 
Correlation Between Deviations From Trend of the Industrial Production Index 
and Various Measures of Prices in Two Sample Periods 
and After Positive (+) and Negative (-) Output Shocks* 
s'Qn °f Correlation of Industrial Production Index With 
Sample Output 
Price Measure x  Period  Shock  x(t- 4)  x(t-3)  *(/-2)  *(M)  x(t)  x(M)  x(U2)  x(t+3)  *(/+4) 
Consumer  1957-72  +  -.01  .01  .01  .00  .03  .25  .16  .05  .02 
Price Index  - -.14  -.15  -.21  -.29  -.32  -.22  -.13  -.01  .16 
1973-89  +  -.14  -.21  -.25  -.24  -.19  -.06  .06  .20  .34 
- -.31  -.36  -.38  -.34  -.27  -.21  -.14  -.06  -.01 
Producer  1957-72  +  -.02  .05  .05  .08  .11  .24  .12  -.00  -.02 
Price Index  - .00  .04  .02  -.00  .00  .06  .11  .12  .24 
1973-89  +  -.07  -.13  -.13  -.09  -.04  .09  .22  .38  .53 
- -.41  -.45  -.45  -.36  -.27  -.21  -.15  -.07  -.03 
GNP Deflator"  1957-72  +  .04  .07  .04  .11  .19  .28  .19  .06  -.13 
- -.12  -.14  -.09  -.06  -.06  -.10  -.14  -.13  -.10 
1973-89  +  -.13  -.17  -.18  -.17  -.14  -.10  -.07  -.00  .10 
- -.21  -.34  -.45  -.45  -.40  -.32  -.26  -.15  -.09 
*AII basic data are quarterly and have been detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
**The GNP deflator is calculated as the ratio of nominal to real gross national product. 
Source of basic data: International Monetary Fund data base 
procyclicality. 
The same conclusion emerges from an examination of 
the cyclicality of particular product prices. Table 1 reports 
output/price correlations for the major wholesale price 
subindexes. With the exception of lumber, every subindex 
examined, as well as the aggregate index, has been strikingly 
more countercyclical since 1973 than in the previous 20-
year period. Indeed, one period ahead, 10 out of 12 output/ 
price correlations are positive for the earlier period. Postwar 
procyclicality thus merits at least the rank of demi-myth. 
... And So Does Direction 
Linear models driven by a single forcing variable generate 
pro- or countercyclical prices regardless of the sign of the 
forcing shock. Calculating the correlations separately for 
positive (+) and negative (-) output innovations thus pro-
vides a natural informal test of single-source stories. Table 
2 reports the results of such a test. 
The statistics suggest a fairly strong asymmetry: prices 
are markedly more countercyclical for negative than for 
positive output innovations. Single-shock business cycle 
models thus would seem to provide inadequate representa-
tions of reality. The dependence of the correlation on the 
sign of the output innovation, furthermore, casts doubt on 
the ability of no-frills increasing-returns models to provide 
a convincing rationale for the cyclical behavior of prices. 
Conclusion 
Kydland and Prescott (1990) have recently argued that the 
"perceived fact" of procyclical prices is but a myth for the 
postwar United States. A more detailed examination of the 
data leaves their fundamental conclusion intact, but suggests 
two qualifications. The countercyclicality appears to be of 
more recent origin than Kydland and Prescott suggest: 
before 1973, U.S. prices display substantial procyclicality. 
In addition, the cyclical behavior of prices exhibits a signifi-
cant asymmetry: the countercyclicality is considerably more 
pronounced for negative than for positive output innova-
tions. 
These findings imply that if real business cycle models 
27 are to provide a convincing representation of reality, then 
demand-side shocks have to be assigned a more exalted role 
than they usually are. [This point has been stressed by 
Prescott (1986, p. 29).] Furthermore, the evidence suggests 
that the common assumption of linearity, while convenient, 
may be a misleading simplification. Needless to say, both 
points merit further quantitative research. 
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